

## Corrigendum

of 13 February 2024

### to ACER 2023 Market Monitoring Report on Demand response and other distributed energy resources: what barriers are holding them back?

In Section 3.4 paragraph 80:

*for:* ‘In most Member States each supplier is only allowed to access data of the final customers with whom they have concluded an electricity supply contract. Accessing data of non-customers is fully restricted without their prior authorisation. Such a restriction applies even in Member States that have set up or plan to set up a Central Data Platform (e.g., Estonia, Luxembourg or Slovenia); however, there are some exceptions where suppliers have access to partial data of non-customers. For example, in Spain suppliers have access to technical data of all connection points, including monthly energy consumption via a Central Data Platform named “SIPS”<sup>35</sup>. For confidentiality reasons, they are not allowed to access their commercial or personal data. With the current national legal framework, only market participants licensed as suppliers are allowed to access this data platform. Third parties such as independent aggregators or energy service companies are required to get a prior final customer’ authorisation before accessing their data. However, when they obtain such an authorisation, they are not allowed to access this Central Data Platform, but must access the data through the DSO website of each individual final customer.’

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*Footnote 36:* As a private initiative, the Spanish DSOs have created the data platform ‘[DATADIS](#)’. It enables each final customer to easily access its electricity consumption data and give authorisations to third parties to access their data including historical aggregate data series.’

In Section 7.1 paragraph 193:

*for:* ‘In Belgium the individual assets must be grouped into capacity market units (i.e., bid blocks) of at least 1 MW of de-rated capacity. Each capacity market unit can be comprised of a single or multiple delivery points. The mechanism allows prequalifying capacity market units for those assets that are not yet deployed or are in planning stages if associated with delivery points prior to the delivery period. In addition, the mechanism limits excessive profits with payback obligation if market prices exceed a strike price. In mid-2023 Belgium approved an exemption from this payback obligation for demand response units.’

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